In the centrally planned economies of Eastern

I
n the initial period following World War II, the East European socialist countries widely adopted the Soviet model of a centrally planned economy. This holds true for the material as well as for the monetary sector of the economy. Furthermore, there was a bread consent about the role money should play in such an economic system in Western as well as in Eastern economic theory?
As a basis for any economic planning, there existed an annual national economic plan, expressed in a well advanced system of material balances. This left little room for monetary dimensions, which in turn served as a mere supplement to the material planning:
[] monetary criteria allowed the gathering together of groups of goods into only one material balance, which had become necessary for the sake of simplicity in the planning process;
[] the socialist enterprises were to be controlled by the central planners with respect to both their productivity and their mini mal production cost; this can best be achieved by a system of monetary ratios;
[] in order to grant a minimum of personal freedom to their citizens, the central planners of most socialist economies preferred to provide them simply with money rather than distribute a specified range of goods to every individual.
The money and credit plan was typically projected with reference to the material plan, which had been completed beforehand. Each monetary transaction can therefore be * University of Duisburg, Germany.
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seen as a mere result of a transaction in the real economic sector, determined by the material plan. This plan could by no means ever be restricted by means of monetary constraints, whatever the purpose of these constraints might have been. True, there have been numerous efforts to establish a rational structure of relative prices both in theory and in practice, 2 but the supply of money and credit continued to be more or less fully determined by those projects and real transactions the central planners were willing to bring on their way, no matter what the necessary monetary transactions eventually would amount to.
Single-tier Banking System
Since any unplanned capital allocation in a centrally planned economy is unwanted and even harmful for plan fulfilment, there had never been a reason for the existence of capital-market institutions of any kind. Thus, there had been no necessity for independent commercial banks to be put into operation. Consequently, the socialist countries established single-tier banking systems with a central bank at their top and some subordinated institutions at the lower level. In general, each of the latter was assigned to one of the industries in the socialist economy.
Each socialist enterprise was obliged to keep its accounts with only one of the subordinated institutions.
This helped the central bank to control the total of monetary transactions made by the socialist enterprises. Thus, in addition to the above-mentioned control by central planners, there evolved a second way of controlling the enterprises, used by the central bank. This is because all the monetary transactions are pure reflections of those expressed in real terms.
The private household sector was largely separate from the socialist economy. Private accounts were only allowed to be kept with special savings banks, which in turn were prohibited from maintaining independent business relations with the socialist economy. Furthermore, the whole range of international currency transactions was handled by special foreign trade banks, totally separate from every other monetary institution except for the central bank.
Central Issues
The strong integration of money and credit planning inside a single-tier banking system did not lead to the expected positive results for the monetary sector. On the contrary, the manageability of money supply and credit was sacrificed from the start, since monetary planning had been subordinated to material economic planning. In the socialist reality, a couple of system-specific mechanisms are to be blamed for monetary i nstabiliti es :3 [] The price-inelastic quest for input by socialist enterprises. Socialist-type enterprises are typically not interested in profits, but in high inputs of wages, staff, equipment and reserves of any kind, in order to prevent conflicts with the workers and bottlenecks in production. For the same reason the enterprises make use of specific deficits in the information of the central planners. The enterprises systematicallydistribute distorted information in order to acquire additional input. 4
[] Like the socialist enterprises, the banks are not interested in profits either. For the banks, there is no incentive at all to curtail credits. Even if there were an interest in restricting further loans, conflicts would be likely to occur not only with socialist enterprises but with the central planners as well.
[] Socialist enterprises usually are bad debt-servers. This is because they are usually not confronted with authentic bankruptcy threats that are closely connected to the enterprises' liquidity situation. Bankruptcy in socialist economies is to be regarded as a political rather than an economic question. As long as there is strong demand for the enterprises' services by central planning boards, any liquidation seems to be most unlikely. Monetary planning is always dominated by real-term planning. This holds true even if planning failures are not to be sought in the monetary sector itself, but in real-term economic planning, as is the case when substantial input overhangs are successfully acquired by the enterprises. In such cases, any rational criteria for the enterprises' contribution to the country's welfare are going to be irreversibly lost. Furthermore, depending on the relative power held by central planning boards, the liquidation of an enterprise may fail due to considerable opposition from workers or citizens. All in all, within a socialist environment there is nothing resembling a linkage of granted credits to economic criteria or, at least, a serious administrative credit restriction.
Such issues are well known as system-specific features of socialist economies. Since every additional credit in a single-tier banking system prolongs the consolidated balance of the domestic banking system,every such credit extends the central bank money by its full amount? The central bank has no opportunity to control the domestic money supply independently. Money supply therefore is an endogenous variable, depending on the strength of the central plan as well as on the power and information of the central planners regarding enterprises, workers and citizens.
Reform of the Hungarian Banking System
As early as 1968, Hungary abolished the traditional system of central planning. Since then economic goals have been expressed in monetary rather than real terms, and the official objective of enterprises is monetary profit alone2 But for several reasons an improvement in resource allocation has not been achieved in reality. On the contrary: the distorted price system and the systemspecific tendency toward monetary overhangs prevented the transition to a price-led economy from coming into operation and thus provided arguments for the bureaucrats to recentralize the competences for resource allocation. Even the necessity of a functioning capital market was totally overlooked by the reformers in 1968: [] Until 1987theoldsingle-tierbankingsystem remained in operation, thus preventing the banks from granting
